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Just as a burn is an injury caused by heat, so is privacy harm a unique injury 
with specific boundaries and characteristics. This Essay describes privacy harm as 
falling into two related categories. The subjective category of privacy harm is the 
perception of unwanted observation. This category describes unwelcome mental 
states—anxiety, embarrassment, fear—that stem from the belief that one is being 
watched or monitored. Examples of subjective privacy harms include everything 
from a landlord eavesdropping on his tenants to generalized government 
surveillance. 
The objective category of privacy harm is the unanticipated or coerced use of 
information concerning a person against that person. These are negative, external 
actions justified by reference to personal information. Examples include identity 
theft, the leaking of classified information that reveals an undercover agent, and 
the use of a drunk-driving suspect’s blood as evidence against him.  
The subjective and objective categories of privacy harm are distinct but related. 
Just as assault is the apprehension of battery, so is the perception of unwanted 
observation largely an apprehension of information-driven injury. The categories 
represent, respectively, the anticipation and consequence of a loss of control over 
personal information.  
This approach offers several advantages. It uncouples privacy harm from 
privacy violations, demonstrating that no person need commit a privacy violation 
for privacy harm to occur (and vice versa). It creates a “limiting principle” 
capable of revealing when another value—autonomy or equality, for instance—is 
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more directly at stake. It also creates a “rule of recognition” that permits the 
identification of a privacy harm when no other harm is apparent. Finally, this 
approach permits the measurement and redress of privacy harm in novel ways. 
INTRODUCTION 
A burn is an injury caused by heat. It has symptoms. It admits of degrees. When 
a doctor diagnoses a burn, she immediately gains insights into how best to treat it. 
She can rule out other causes. She can even make recommendations on how to 
avoid this particular harm in the future. 
What is a privacy harm? What makes it distinct from a burn or some other 
harm? We are often at a loss to say.1 Privacy harm is conceptualized, if at all, as the 
negative consequence of a privacy violation. Far from a source of leverage or 
insight, privacy harm often operates as a hurdle to reform or redress. A privacy 
harm must be “cognizable,” “actual,” “specific,” “material,” “fundamental,” or 
“special” before a court will consider awarding compensation.2 Leading 
commentators question whether privacy harm is much of a harm at all.3  
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Few have endeavored to define privacy harm. Instead, scholars mostly approach the 
topic by defining the underlying concept of privacy and describing privacy violation. See, 
e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY & FREEDOM (1967); Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 
475 (1968); Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 280 (1974) 
(defining privacy as “control over who can sense us”); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, 
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890) (defining privacy as “the right to be let 
alone”). But see Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 877 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 482 
(2006) [hereinafter Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy] (understanding privacy in terms of 
“specific activities that pose privacy problems”); Paul Ohm, The Benefits of the Old Privacy: 
Restoring the Focus to Traditional Harm, Privacy Law Scholars Conference (June 4, 2010). 
This Essay addresses Daniel Solove’s inventive approach in Part I.B.  
 2. See Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 620 (2004) (“The Government claims the minimum 
guarantee [of the Privacy Act] goes only to victims who prove some actual damages. We 
think the Government has the better side of the argument.”); id. at 625−26 (remarking on the 
intent of Congress of “avoiding giveaways to plaintiffs with nothing more than ‘abstract 
injuries’” (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101−02 (1983))); see also Lambert v. 
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that loss of personal information at issue 
implicated neither liberty nor property); Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 257 (D. 
Conn. 2008) (requiring privacy harm to be “special” in order to proceed anonymously); cf. 
Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1227, 1232 (2003) [hereinafter Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of 
Vulnerability] (“[P]rivacy is most protected in situations where damages can be defined 
palpably . . . .”). 
 3. Richard Posner in particular takes a dim view of privacy harm. See, e.g., Richard A. 
Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 251 (2008) [hereinafter 
Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law] (“Privacy is the terrorist’s best friend . . . .”); 
Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 398 (1978) (“At some point 
nondisclosure becomes fraud.”); see also STEWART A. BAKER, SKATING ON STILTS: WHY WE 
AREN’T STOPPING TOMORROW’S TERRORISM (2010); AMATAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF 
PRIVACY (1999); William J. Stuntz, Secret Service: Against Privacy and Transparency, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 17, 2006, at 12.  
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This Essay does not attempt to furnish a new definition of privacy, nor to 
catalogue the many values that privacy protects. Rather, it describes privacy harm 
as a unique type of injury with its own characteristics and mechanisms.4 By 
delineating the specific boundaries of privacy harm, this Essay furnishes a 
defensible means by which to rule out and recognize privacy harms. It also permits 
measurement and redress of privacy harms in novel ways.  
I argue here that the vast majority of privacy harms fall into just two 
categories—one subjective, the other objective.5 The subjective category of privacy 
harm is the perception of unwanted observation. This category describes 
unwelcome mental states—anxiety, for instance, or embarrassment—that 
accompany the belief that one is or will be watched or monitored. Examples 
include the harm experienced by the tenants in Hamberger v. Eastman,6 the unease 
caused by a massive data breach, and the concern over generalized surveillance at 
issue in the Keith case7 and Laird v. Tatum.8  
The objective category of privacy harm is the unanticipated or coerced use of 
information concerning a person against that person. These are negative, external 
actions justified by reference to personal information. Examples include the 
unanticipated sale of a user’s contact information that results in spam and the 
leaking of classified information that exposes an undercover intelligence agent.9 An 
example of a known but coerced use might be found in Schmerber v. California, 
where a drunk-driving suspect’s blood was drawn without his consent and then 
introduced at trial as evidence against him.10  
The subjective and objective categories of privacy harm are distinct but related. 
Just as assault is the anticipation of battery, so is the perception of unwanted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. This Essay does not attempt to capture all of the senses—“spatial,” “decisional,” 
“proprietary,” “physical”—in which commenters use the word “privacy.” See Anita L. 
Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and Values, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING 
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 31, 34 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) 
(describing four dimensions of privacy); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace 
Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1202–05 (1998) (describing three dimensions to 
privacy). Nor does it attempt to create a list of the values that privacy protects. See, e.g., 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008) [hereinafter SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING 
PRIVACY]; WESTIN, supra note 1. Rather, it argues that privacy harm is unique in that it is a 
harm tied broadly to observation. See infra Part II (describing this relationship in detail). 
 5. By “subjective,” I mean internal to the mind of the victim. By “objective,” I mean 
external. My use of the terms generally comports with their usage in traditional psychology, 
see Jay Moore, Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction, 18 BEHAV. 
ANALYST 33, 33 (1995), with an important exception: I am counting events that are 
subjective to person A as objective to person B. See infra note 11. 
 6. 206 A.2d 239, 241 (N.H. 1964) (landlord surreptitiously recorded the conversations 
of his tenants).  
 7. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972). This case is 
sometimes referred to as the “Keith case” after the district court judge, Judge Damon Keith, 
who ordered the government to turn over the results of its surveillance. 
 8. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 9. See, e.g., Wilson v. Libby, 498 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing for 
“special factors”). 
 10. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
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observation largely an apprehension of information misuse. This Essay is not a 
metaphysical inquiry into the nature of privacy. But the approach does build upon a 
standard conception. The subjective and objective components of privacy harm are 
two sides of a well-worn coin: the loss of control over information about oneself or 
one’s attributes.11 
This Essay begins in Part I by exploring the advantages of describing boundaries 
in the first place. Delimiting privacy harm furnishes both a “limiting principle” and 
a “rule of recognition.”12 There are circumstances when ruling out privacy harm 
may force courts and theorists to confront other basic values such as autonomy or 
equality. We see this most vividly in the context of contraception, abortion, and 
sodomy regulation, where privacy obviates the perceived need to grapple with other 
crucial, yet perhaps more politically contestable, values.13 Conversely, courts 
sometimes resist recognition of an unfamiliar harm in the absence of a concrete test 
or an obvious perpetrator.  
Part II describes a set of actual boundaries and properties in detail and discusses 
the relative advantages of this approach. The approach “fits” the facts in the sense 
that it captures most situations we think of as causing privacy harm.14 It adds 
conceptual clarity by unifying psychological and material injuries in ways we have 
not before. By uncoupling privacy harms from privacy violations, moreover, the 
approach debunks a widely held view—that privacy harm can only occur when one 
human being observes another. Privacy harm can and does occur in the absence of 
a human perpetrator.  
Understanding its mechanics also permits the measurement of privacy harms in 
novel ways. With subjective privacy harms, for instance, we can ask about the 
degree of antipathy toward the observation, as well as the extent of perceived 
                                                                                                                 
 
 11. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 1, at 7 (“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about 
them is communicated to others.”); Fried, supra note 1, at 483 (conceiving of privacy as 
“control over knowledge about oneself”); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977) (defining privacy as “autonomy or control over the intimacies 
of personal identity”); Parker, supra note 1, at 280 (defining privacy as “control over who 
can sense us”); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 555 
F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“It is widely accepted that privacy deals with determining 
for oneself when, how, and to whom personal information will be disclosed to others.”). 
According to Paul Schwartz, “[t]he leading paradigm on the Internet and in the real, or 
offline world, conceives of privacy as personal right to control the use of one’s data.” Paul 
A. Schwartz, Commentary, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 820 
(2000). 
 12. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97–107 (1961) (introducing the concept of 
a rule of recognition to distinguish law from mere commands backed by threats). 
 13. See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text. Identifying a privacy harm obviates 
the need to grapple with different values in other contexts as well. In E.I. duPont de 
Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970), for instance, the court 
found that aerial photographs of a plant by a competitor constituted an invasion of 
“commercial privacy.” Arguably, the act was better described as an instance of unfair 
competition.  
 14. See Parker, supra note 1, at 276 (describing the importance that a theory of privacy 
“fit the data”).  
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observation. Thus, in De May v. Roberts, where a woman allowed a doctor’s friend 
to watch her give birth on the false assumption that the friend was a fellow medical 
professional, the degree of observation was limited but highly unwanted.15 
Conversely, observation in a public place is implicitly accepted. Yet closed-circuit 
television (“CCTV”) surveillance of public streets could still rise to the level of 
harm in my view if extensive. 
Part III addresses various counterarguments. Scholars have included “threats,” 
“risks,” and “architectural harms” as privacy harms.16 I would not, and I believe it 
will be easier to understand and avoid such harms once they are distinguished from 
the privacy harms that partly constitute them. I also hold that privacy harms can 
occur without privacy violations and vice versa. I defend this approach, 
acknowledging the possibility of accidental or even autogenic privacy harm, as 
when a paranoid schizophrenic holds the mistaken belief that he is under 
surveillance, and questioning the harm of the classic privacy violation—the hidden 
Peeping Tom. 
I. WHY DELIMIT PRIVACY HARM? 
The purpose of this Essay is to delineate the boundaries of privacy harm and 
describe its inner mechanics. But why is the search for a boundary worthwhile? 
What do we gain from distinguishing privacy harm from other harm or from the 
underlying concept of privacy? Part I.A argues that delimiting privacy harm helps 
to address and protect privacy and other values. Part I.B addresses an influential 
approach to conceptualizing privacy—Daniel Solove’s “taxonomy” of privacy 
problems—that is implicitly skeptical of the possibility and usefulness of 
delimiting privacy harm.17 
A. Why Setting Boundaries Matters 
Privacy harm is a crucial but under-theorized aspect of an important issue. We 
should understand its mechanism and scope if only for the sake of conceptual 
clarity. But identifying its boundaries will also be of practical use to scholars, 
courts, and regulators attempting to vindicate and protect privacy and other values. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 15. 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881). 
 16. Daniel Solove is a prominent proponent of this view. See, e.g., Solove, A Taxonomy 
of Privacy, supra note 1, at 487–88 (discussing risk of harm and power imbalance); see also 
DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 
97–101 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON]; Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, 
and the Architecture of Vulnerability, supra note 2, at 1232 (“A number of privacy problems 
do not consist merely of a series of isolated and discrete invasions or harms, but are systemic 
in nature.”); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for 
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy and 
Power]; Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1706 (“The accretion problem is this: Once an 
adversary has linked to anonymized databases together, he can add the newly linked data to 
his collection of outside information and use it to unlock other anonymized databases.”). 
 17. See generally Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1. 
1136 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1131 
 
A working definition of privacy harm gives us a “limiting principle” that guards 
against dilution and may reveal other important harms. It also means having a “rule 
of recognition” that permits the identification of novel privacy harms as they 
emerge.  
1. A Limiting Principle 
Misdiagnosing a problem makes it hard to fix. Imagine what would happen if a 
doctor confused heartburn with a first-degree burn. Our unlikely doctor might 
prescribe antibiotic ointment and ibuprofen in place of antacids and diet change. 
The patient might actually feel better at first—reassured by the visit to the doctor or 
desensitized by the painkiller—but the treatment would not ultimately be effective.  
Courts can also misdiagnose harm, leading to a topical salve in place of a true 
cure. In the absence of a limiting principle, mistake or hesitance can lead courts to 
see privacy harm in situations where privacy is arguably not the primary value at 
stake.18 And, having identified the harm, a court may not be inclined to revisit the 
diagnosis.  
In Griswold v. Connecticut, for instance, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Connecticut statute prohibiting the use of contraception.19 Arguably what was at 
issue in Griswold was the basic liberty of a woman or a couple to decide whether to 
procreate. But the Court understood—and continues to understand—contraception 
regulation in terms of marital privacy.20 Appellant “Jane Roe” argued against the 
infamous restriction at issue in Roe v. Wade on the ground that it restricted her 
liberty.21 The Court struck the regulation down on the basis that the “right of 
privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.”22  
                                                                                                                 
 
 18. See Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1, at 563 (noting the “common 
pitfall” that a court might identify privacy harm “to the exclusion of all others”). The 
absence of a limiting principle is generally frowned upon at law, forming the basis of many 
counter-arguments and adverse rulings. See, e.g., Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 561 n.11 
(2007) (“We ground our judgment on the elusiveness of a limiting principle . . . .”); IBP, Inc. 
v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 23 (2005) (“No limiting principle allows this Court to conclude that 
the waiting time here is such an activity . . . .”); United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 
839, 886 (1996) (“[I]ts failure to advance any limiting principle at all would effectively 
compromise the Government’s capacity as a reliable, straightforward contractor whenever 
the subject matter of a contract might be subject to subsequent regulation, which is most if 
not all of the time.”). 
 19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 20. Id. at 485–86. 
 21. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973). On another view, equality is the value 
at stake in the abortion cases. See MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, 
THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 11 (1999) (“Equal choice provides broader 
constitutional grounds for attacking pro-life policies than do conventional pro-choice 
defenses of Roe.”). But see Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1087, 1106 (2006) (book review) (arguing that decisional privacy cases can be read as 
“telling an information privacy story as well”).  
 22. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court invalidated a Texas statute 
criminalizing certain sexual acts between two people of the same gender.23 The 
Court began by acknowledging that “[t]he instant case involves liberty of the 
person both in its spatial and its more transcendent dimensions.”24 Rather than rely 
on liberty alone, however, or invoke the notion of equality, the Court again turned 
to the private nature of the activity to strike down the restriction as applied.25 
One might reasonably question whether denying women or homosexuals the 
right to exercise control over their own bodies is best understood as a privacy harm. 
This Essay will argue in the next Part that a privacy harm is something else 
entirely. Nevertheless, a harm has occurred. The restrictions at issue in Roe and 
Lawrence fell upon a specific group (women, gays) and hence could be said to 
implicate equality.26 Such rules also interfere with the proverbial “pursuit of 
happiness” on free terms. These are very basic values that eventually must surface 
and be confronted.27 
Protecting the right to use contraception or choose sexual partners merely 
because they happen to take place in private—the same approach we take with the 
possession of obscenity28—does not actually address these issues by legitimizing 
the underlying conduct. Quite the opposite. This approach may be helpful in the 
short run, that is, before society is prepared to recognize the real issues at stake. In 
the long run, however, it operates to obscure and perhaps demean the important 
harms taking place.29  
This is not to deny that privacy has value. If anything, it is overuse of the term 
that risks its diffusion into a meaningless catchall. Thus, a second advantage to 
having a limiting principle is that it helps protect against dilution of the concept of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 24. Id. at 562. 
 25. Id. at 578 (“The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State 
cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct 
a crime.”). For an insightful discussion of Lawrence and its implications for equality and 
citizenship, see Sonia K. Kaytal, The Dissident Citizen, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (2010). 
 26. See GRABER, supra note 21, at 11; Kaytal, supra note 25. 
 27. Both equality under the law and the right to the free pursuit of happiness are 
specifically mentioned in our founding documents (as amended). Privacy is not. See U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776). 
 28. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (“As we have said, the States 
retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere 
possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home.”). Having sex with one’s 
preferred partner, using contraception, and terminating a pregnancy are not like possessing 
obscenity. It should also be noted that claims of privacy harm have operated at times to 
protect abhorrent conduct such as domestic violence. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of 
Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117 (1996).  
 29. Privacy is a value we are notoriously—and increasingly—comfortable balancing 
against other values. Many believe that privacy does not invoke the highest standards of 
scrutiny reserved for the abrogation of equality or other values mentioned specifically in the 
Constitution that are at the core of what it means to be a liberal democracy. See supra note 3 
(listing examples of scholars who do not view privacy harm as deserving a high level of 
scrutiny). By delimiting privacy harm, we can rule out this layer and reveal the true value 
that makes our citizens and jurists rightly uncomfortable.  
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privacy.30 If too many problems come to be included under the rubric of privacy 
harm—everything from contraception to nuisance—we risk losing sight of what is 
important and uniquely worrisome about the loss of privacy.31 Setting boundaries 
concentrates the notion of privacy harm and bolsters the case for why privacy 
deserves to be enforced in its own right. 
2. A Rule of Recognition 
A hasty diagnosis may obscure a serious medical problem. But sometimes 
doctors look at a constellation of symptoms and see no disease at all. Courts, too, 
can resist recognition of an unfamiliar harm.32 Understanding the boundaries and 
mechanics of privacy harm may also allow for a “rule of recognition,” that is, a 
means to identify and evidence a non-obvious problem.  
Take as an example the singling out of vulnerable populations for marketing. 
The elderly and other groups can experience difficulty looking critically at offers to 
purchase. Setting aside actual fraud, there is extensive evidence that marketers 
assemble and trade lists of individuals who are members of these particularly 
vulnerable populations.33 These lists are often compiled on the basis of sensitive 
information such as age and disability, and generally contain the person’s name, 
address, and other personally identifiable information.34  
Without looking at the underlying privacy issue, however, it becomes hard to 
understand and regulate this problem. The elderly and the disabled live in society 
just as everyone else. They consume goods, vote, and communicate with the 
outside world—all desirable outcomes. The elderly will inevitably encounter offers 
and ads. But once we recognize that vulnerable populations are specifically located, 
targeted, and pitched on the basis of sensitive personal information,35 we can move 
to secure that information and reduce their exposure to advertising to random 
chance.  
In other instances, a principled approach to recognizing privacy harm will make 
it possible to bolster and evidence our initial intuitions. We tend to think of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 30. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“One 
of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to 
substitute for the crucial word or words of a constitutional guarantee another word or words, 
more or less flexible and more or less restricted in meaning.”). 
 31. This is also the reason that we protect commercial speech less than noncommercial 
speech under the First Amendment; we wish to avoid the dilution of the force of First 
Amendment protection “simply by a leveling process.” Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
469, 481 (1989).  
 32. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber 
Gender Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 392–95 (2009) (discussing the history of the 
emotional distress tort and the reticence of the courts to allow recovery). 
 33. See The Modern Permanent Record and Consumer Impacts from the Offline and 
Online, Testimony of Pam Dixon Before the Subcommittee on Communications, Technology, 
and the Internet, and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of 
the House Committee on Energy, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Nov. 19, 2009), 
www.worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/TestimonyofPamDixonfs.pdf. 
 34. See id. 
 35. See id. 
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unsolicited spam e-mail as a privacy harm, for instance, and federal law regulates it 
in part on this basis.36 But the analogy is strained: on what theory is getting 
unwanted commercial e-mail any more a violation of privacy than getting your 
home mailbox stuffed with toilet paper as a prank? Moreover, the content of 
unsolicited e-mail is entitled to some First Amendment protection, which makes it 
harder to regulate.37 
Seeing the privacy harm in unsolicited e-mail requires looking closely at how 
mass spam is generated through a particular lens. As several scholars point out, 
spam is often targeted on the basis of purchased or misappropriated private 
information.38 Spam requires an e-mail address, generally considered personally 
identifiable information, to reach an inbox.39 This suggests a novel way to regulate 
spam or junk mail: directly as “objective privacy harm.”40 
B. The Taxonomic Approach: A Critique 
At least one leading privacy scholar has questioned both the possibility and 
usefulness of defining privacy or privacy harm. In a series of influential articles and 
books, Daniel Solove rejects the notion that privacy can or should be reduced to 
any one, or even multiple, concept(s).41 According to Solove, all previous attempts 
to do so have failed for being over- or underinclusive.42 Solove abandons the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. See Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 
2003 (“CAN-SPAM”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–7713 (2006); S. REP. NO. 108-102 (2003) 
(legislative history referring to the impact of spam on privacy). 
 37. See, e.g., Jaynes v. Commonwealth, 666 S.E.2d 303, 314 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 1670 (2009) (striking down state anti-spam law as overbroad). 
 38. See Kang, supra note 4, at 1204 (“The junk mail, phone call, or message invades my 
space, spamming my physical, voice, and electronic mailboxes. More importantly but less 
obviously, the initial targeting of that junk mail to me may have involved access to and 
analysis of personal information . . . .” (citation omitted)); Reidenberg, supra note 1, at 881–
82 (“[T]he receipt of junk mail or junk telemarketing calls are nuisances for most people. 
They are intrusive, though infrequently at the level of noxiousness. The annoyance is a 
derivative consequence of an underlying privacy wrong. The underlying privacy wrong is 
the misuse of personal information that gives rise to the unwanted solicitation.”).  
 39. See, e.g., California Online Privacy Protection Act, CA. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 22577(a)(3) (West 2008) (defining e-mail as personally identifiable information). Of 
course, much spam reaches inboxes through randomly generated e-mail addresses—
automated guesswork supported by various inputs.  
 40. See infra Part II.B (defining objective privacy harm).  
 41. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 1–38; Daniel J. Solove, 
Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing 
Privacy]; Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, supra note 1, at 479–84. Solove’s pragmatic and 
inclusive approach to privacy is widely cited, including by federal courts. See, e.g., Nat’l 
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 
2009); Doe v. Biang, 494 F. Supp. 2d 880, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Over seventy secondary 
sources have cited to A Taxonomy of Privacy since its publication in 2006. 
 42. See generally Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 41. Solove uses one 
theory of privacy against another, that is, he “survey[s] the criticisms of various scholars 
regarding each other’s conceptions of privacy and suggest[s] a number of [his] own.” 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 8. Generally speaking, Solove’s 
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quixotic search for a definition of privacy and instead develops a “taxonomy” of 
related but distinct activities that raise privacy problems, selected on the basis of 
what the right sorts of authorities associate with the concept.  
For Solove, it is “no accident” that we refer to each of his sixteen subcategories 
of privacy harms “under the rubric of ‘privacy.’”43 But at the same time, “privacy 
issues are different from one another and do not have a core characteristic in 
common.”44 To reconcile this tension, Solove turns to philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s notion of “family resemblances.”45 Wittgenstein has denied that 
concepts necessarily share one common characteristic; “rather, they draw from a 
common pool of similar characteristics.”46  
Solove offers Wittgenstein’s example of a family with common characteristics 
such as “build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.”47 “[E]ach child 
may have certain features similar to each parent, and the children may share similar 
features with each other, but they may not resemble each other in the same way. 
Nevertheless, they all bear a resemblance to each other.”48 The different aspects of 
privacy are like the members of the Wittgenstein family that share no common 
characteristic but instead create “a complicated network of similarities overlapping 
and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail.”49  
In this way, Solove suggests the irrelevance and improvidence of attempting to 
set boundaries around the concept of privacy or privacy harm. Those boundaries 
will always fail by including activities that do not deserve the label “privacy,” or 
leaving out ones that do. Solove specifically disavows the utility of isolating 
privacy harms from other sorts of harms. He is far more interested, he notes, in 
identifying problems than in classifying them as privacy problems per se.50  
There is no denying the value of the complete, nuanced, and interconnected 
picture of privacy that Solove’s taxonomy presents. Solove delivers what he 
promises, that is, “a framework for understanding privacy in a pluralistic and 
                                                                                                                 
criticisms “boil down to claims that the theories are too narrow, too broad, or too vague.” Id. 
Having arranged a circular firing squad that leaves no scholar standing, Solove sets about his 
own conceptual project. 
 43. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 46. 
 44. Id. at 45. 
 45. Id. at 42–44; see also Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 41, at 1096–99 
(discussing Wittgenstein’s theory of family resemblances).  
 46. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 42; see also id. at 9. 
 47. Id. at 42. 
 48. Id. at 42–43. 
 49. Id. at 42. 
 50. In response to the anticipated argument that one subcategory of his taxonomy, that 
of “distortion,” is not a true privacy harm, Solove counters: “But does it matter? Regardless 
of whether distortion is classified as a privacy problem, it is nevertheless a problem.” Daniel 
J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 745, 760 (2007) (“Whether a particular problem is classified as one of privacy 
is not as important as whether it is recognized as a problem.”). Solove goes on to say that 
“[c]lassifying [distortion] as a privacy problem is merely saying that it bears some 
resemblance to other privacy problems, and viewing them together might be helpful in 
addressing them.” Id. 
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contextual manner.”51 To see the limitations of this approach, however, and the 
lingering need for principles that delimit privacy harm, we need to examine how 
privacy problems come to be included in the taxonomy in the first place.  
A taxonomy is a means of classification. Wittgenstein’s notion of family 
resemblances notwithstanding, it turns out to be impossible to classify without 
reference to an “overarching principle.”52 A grocery list is a simple example. It 
contains items one needs that can be found in a grocery store. Oil does not go on a 
grocery list, tomatoes do. The same is true of a list or taxonomy of privacy harms. 
Criteria for inclusion or exclusion are essential. 
Solove’s criteria for inclusion involve recognition by the right sorts of 
authorities. His taxonomy “accounts for privacy problems that have achieved a 
significant degree of social recognition.”53 It captures “the kinds of privacy 
problems that are addressed in various discussions about privacy, laws, cases, 
constitutions, guidelines, and other sources.”54 Solove specifically turns to the law 
because “it provides concrete evidence of what problems societies have recognized 
as warranting attention.”55 
But what happens if someone disagrees with these sources? How does one go 
about denying that a given harm is a privacy harm? I’ve argued that it would be 
useful to deny that limits on abortion, contraception, and sodomy concern privacy 
because doing so could reveal the real values of, for instance, autonomy and 
equality. Conversely, how does one go about arguing that a new harm should be 
included as a privacy harm, before the right sorts of authorities have recognized it 
as such? We would have to wait until they do.56  
Mere resemblance to other privacy harms is not enough. Sometimes we want to 
include something on a list that resembles no other item on it. We might want to 
say, for instance, that a foster or adopted child is part of a family, even in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 10. 
 52. Id. at 105 (“My taxonomy’s categories are not based upon any overarching 
principle. We do not need overarching principles to understand and recognize problems.”). 
Of course, a list could have more than one principle. A shopping list could contain both 
clothing and groceries. Indeed, several theories of privacy have more than one principle or 
dimension. See, e.g., JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND 
THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 73–80 (2007) (describing three privacy “clusters”); Allen, supra 
note 4, at 34 (describing four dimensions to privacy); Kang, supra note 4 (describing three 
dimensions to privacy); see also Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 41, at 1125–26 
(“Other scholars also recognize that privacy cannot be consolidated into a single 
conception . . . . [Yet] they still circumscribe privacy based on the boundaries of each of the 
clustered conceptions.”). 
 53. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 101–02. 
 54. Id. at 172. 
 55. Id. at 102. 
 56. Solove might argue that we recognize new harms by analogy to existing ones. But 
we would still need criteria for claiming something is a good or a bad analogy. As Danielle 
Keats Citron and Leslie Meltzer Henry point out in their review of Understanding Privacy, 
Solove must “say more about . . . how his theory can resist ossification and remain dynamic 
over time.” Danielle Keats Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the 
Value of Privacy in the Twenty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1120 (2010) (book 
review). 
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absence of overlapping “build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc.”57 
We might want to argue that a gay couple is a family so that one can visit the other 
in the hospital. The concept of family requires more than an ex post description of 
resemblances.58 It necessitates a thick definition, predicated on normative and 
political commitments that permit analysis and disagreement. 
Conversely, we might want to deny that two phenomena that resemble one 
another in certain ways are in fact the same. Skin burns and heartburn resemble one 
another in certain ways—they cause pain, for instance, and are both referred to as 
“burns” by the medical community. But they do not resemble one another in the 
right ways, that is, the ways that permit proper diagnosis and treatment. 
Resemblance is not enough in the face of disagreement; the question becomes what 
resemblances matter.  
To be sure, Solove’s approach makes many wise turns. It eschews the elusive 
search for a concept of privacy in favor of a pragmatic approach that focuses 
specifically on privacy problems and their resulting harms to individuals and 
society. But without a limiting principle or rule of recognition, we lack the ability 
to deny that certain harms have anything to do with privacy or to argue that wholly 
novel privacy harms should be included, which in turn can be useful in protecting 
privacy and other values. The next Part accordingly bites the proverbial bullet and 
defends a theory of privacy harm on its own terms.  
II. THE OUTER BOUNDARIES AND CORE PROPERTIES OF PRIVACY HARM 
Describing the outer boundaries and core properties of privacy harm helps to 
reveal values, identify and address new problems, and guard against dilution. But 
exactly what are those boundaries and properties? Little scholarship is devoted 
specifically to this question. This Part describes the contours and mechanics of 
privacy harm in detail.  
I maintain that privacy harms fall into two categories. The first category is 
“subjective” in the sense of being internal to the person harmed. Subjective privacy 
harms are those that flow from the perception of unwanted observation. Subjective 
privacy harms can be acute or ongoing, and can accrue to one individual or to 
many. They can range in severity from mild discomfort at the presence of a security 
camera to “mental pain and distress[] far greater than could be inflicted by mere 
bodily injury.”59 Generally, to be considered harmful the observation must be 
unwanted. We hesitate to see subjective harm where, as often, the observation is 
welcome.60 But actual observation need not occur to cause harm; perception of 
observation can be enough. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 42 (citation omitted). 
 58. We might say that all families resemble one another in that they are a family. This 
would of course be circular.  
 59. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 196 (describing the harm associated with 
invasive journalism). 
 60. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 102 (“When a person 
consents to . . . these activities, there is no privacy violation.”); Parker, supra note 1, at 282 
(“If we tell someone that we are homosexual, we lose control over private information, but 
we do not necessarily lose privacy.”); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 218 (“The right 
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The second category is “objective” in the sense of being external to the person 
harmed. This set of harms involves the forced or unanticipated use of information 
about a person against that person. Objective privacy harms can occur when 
personal information is used to justify an adverse action against a person, as when 
the government leverages data mining of sensitive personal information to block a 
citizen from air travel, or when one neighbor forms a negative judgment about 
another based on gossip. Objective harms can also occur when such information is 
used to commit a crime, such as identity theft or murder.61 To constitute harm, the 
use must be unanticipated or, if known to the victim, coerced. Again, however, no 
human being actually needs to see the personal information itself for it to be used 
against the victim. 
The subjective and objective categories of privacy harm are distinct but not 
entirely separate. Assault and battery are two distinct torts.62 Each can occur 
without the other. They have different elements.63 These two torts are nevertheless 
linked in that one is the apprehension of the other. The harm of assault is an 
internal or subjective state, specifically, the apprehension of unwanted touching.64 
The harm of battery is the unwanted physical contact itself.65  
The two components of privacy harm are related in an analogous way. Objective 
privacy harm is the actual adverse consequence—the theft of identity itself or the 
formation of a negative opinion—that flows from the loss of control over 
information or sensory access.66 Subjective privacy harm is, by and large, the 
perception of loss of control that results in fear or discomfort. The two categories 
are distinct but related. They are two sides of the same coin: loss of control over 
personal information. 
Part II.A describes the subjective component of privacy harms. Part II.B 
describes the objective component. Thinking about privacy harm in this way 
confers multiple advantages, discussed in detail in Part II.C. 
                                                                                                                 
to privacy ceases upon the publication of the facts by the individual, or with his consent.”). 
 61. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003) (stalker killed 
woman after obtaining her work address from a data broker). 
 62. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965) (describing the tort of 
assault), with id. at § 13 (describing the tort of battery). 
 63. The elements of battery are (a) an act intended to cause a harmful or offensive 
contact with a person, (b) resulting directly or indirectly in actual harmful contact with that 
person or a third party. Id. at § 13. The elements of assault are (a) an act intended to cause a 
harmful or offensive contact, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, (b) resulting in 
such imminent apprehension. Id. at § 21. 
 64. See id. § 21 cmt. c. (“In order that the actor shall be liable under the rule stated in 
this Section, it is only necessary that his act should cause an apprehension of an immediate 
contact, whether harmful or merely offensive. It is not necessary that it should directly or 
indirectly cause any tangible and material harm to the other.”). 
 65. See id. § 13 cmt. a.  
 66. By “sensory access,” I mean access to information in the form of sensory data. 
When a person loses sensory access, for purposes of this Essay, he loses the ability to keep 
someone from observing him physically. Cf. Parker, supra note 1, at 281 (“By ‘sensed,’ is 
meant simply seen, heard, touched, smelled, or tasted. By ‘parts of us,’ is meant the parts of 
our bodies, our voices, and the products of our bodies.”). 
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A. Subjective Privacy Harms 
The subjective category of privacy harm is the perception of unwanted 
observation, broadly defined. Watching a person directly—their body, brain waves, 
or behavior—is observation. So, too, is reading a report of their preferences, 
associations, and whereabouts. Observation can also include inference, as when we 
make “an observation” about someone on the basis of what we know about them. 
Observation, as this Essay understands the term, may include everything from a 
“casual observation” with an “inhibitive effect on most individuals that makes them 
more formal and uneasy,”67 to Roger Clarke’s concept of encompassing 
“dataveillance.”68 
The observation at issue must be “unwanted” to constitute a harm, lest almost 
any interaction rise to the level of a privacy problem. The law often considers 
consent to be binary;69 aversion to observation, however, naturally admits of 
degrees. We can welcome observation or be neutral as to it. We can object to 
observation but a little or quite a lot. We may hold a slight antipathy for the bulk of 
observation that takes place in public, for instance, but be very upset by the 
prospect of observation in an intimate location70 or during an embarrassing 
moment.71 
The underlying cause of subjective privacy harm can be acute or ongoing. A 
person may feel embarrassed in the moment by a single act of observation, as when 
she walks through a backscatter device in airport security that creates a picture of 
her naked body.72 Or she may feel an ongoing sense of regret about an 
embarrassing revelation lingering somewhere online.73 In one recent example, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 447 (1980). 
 68. Roger Clarke, Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data 
Surveillance, 4 J.L. & INFO. SCI. 4032 (1993). Clarke defines dataveillance as “the systematic 
use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or 
communications of one or more persons.” Id.; see also Roger A. Clarke, Information 
Technology and Dataveillance, in COMPUTERIZATION AND CONTROVERSY: VALUE CONFLICTS 
AND SOCIAL CHOICES 496 (Charles Dunlop & Rob Kling eds., 1991).  
 69. See Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1446 (2009) (bemoaning the “take it or leave it” nature of 
many contracts); id. at 1456 (urging courts to “stop treating contractual consent as binary—
as existing or not existing”).  
 70. The home in particular has been treated as sacrosanct under the law. See SOLOVE, 
UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
 71. The federal government and several states have enacted so-called “up-skirt laws” in 
recognition that privacy violations can occur even in public places. See, e.g., Video 
Voyeurism Prevention Act of 2004, 118 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 108-504, at 2–
3 (2004) (referencing state laws and discussing legislative intent). 
 72. These devices immediately delete the image in most cases. For a discussion of 
backscatter devices, see Jeffrey Rosen, Nude Awakening, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 10, 2010, at 8; 
see also Emergency Motion for Stay of Agency Rule Decision Needed No Later than July 
13, 2010, at 3–8, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Napolitano, No. 10-1157 (D.C. 
Cir. July 2, 2010) (describing privacy issues with backscatter devices in detail). 
 73. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007). Subject to a few exceptions, websites and other 
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Reeves v. Equifax Information Services, a federal trial court denied a credit agency 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment where the alleged harm was the 
emotional distress associated with the mere knowledge that a credit report remained 
uncorrected.74 
Subjective harms need not occur in the moment; many feelings of violation have 
a delayed effect. In a seminal privacy case, De May v. Roberts, a woman gave birth 
in the presence of a doctor and a man she believed to be the doctor’s medical 
assistant.75 She learned only later that the man was the doctor’s untrained 
acquaintance. Although she made no objection to the man’s presence when she 
believed he was a medical professional, the court permitted her to recover for a 
privacy violation “upon afterwards ascertaining his true character.”76 It follows that 
many subjective privacy harms—a landlord’s hidden microphone, for instance—
will be backward looking insofar as the offending observation has already ended at 
the time of discovery (or because of it).77  
A different privacy harm occurs where observation is systematic, that is, part of 
a plan or pattern. Pervasive individual monitoring is, for instance, a key component 
of control in domestic abuse situations.78 Repeated “checking in” throughout the 
day is thought to be an early sign of domestic abuse.79 It may also be that the so-
called “learned helplessness” experienced by some abuse victims stems in part 
from having internalized the feeling of being monitored.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the threat systematized governmental 
surveillance can impose on a citizenry. “The price of lawful public dissent must not 
be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance power,” the Court noted in 
the Keith case.80 “Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter 
vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private 
conversation.”81 Although the Court in Laird v. Tatum found insufficient evidence 
                                                                                                                 
intermediaries are under no obligation to take pictures down even if they are adjudged by a 
court to be unlawful. 
 74. No. 2:09cv45KS-MTP, 2010 WL 2036661 (S.D. Miss. May 20, 2010). 
 75. 9 N.W. 146, 146 (Mich. 1881).  
 76. Id. at 149. 
 77. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964) (landlord surveillance 
of tenants).  
 78. One category of the “Power and Control Wheel” developed by the Domestic Abuse 
Intervention Programs to detect abuse is “isolation.” See Power and Control Wheel, 
DOMESTIC ABUSE INTERVENTION PROGRAMS, http://www.theduluthmodel.org/ 
wheelgallery.php. Isolation is sustained by, inter alia, “tracking or monitoring activities 
and/or whereabouts.” Domestic Violence, Identifying Abuse and Abusers, Power and 
Control, CITY OF RENTON, http://rentonwa.gov/living/default.aspx?id=1614.  
 79. See Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Domestic Violence and Abuse: Signs of Abuse 
and Abusive Relationships, HELPGUIDE.ORG (Oct. 2010), 
http://helpguide.org/mental/domestic_violence_ abuse_types_signs_causes_effects.htm. The 
notion of a “gendered” or “male” gaze also underpins certain feminist scholarship around 
privacy. See, e.g., Jeannie Suk, Is Privacy a Woman?, 97 GEO. L.J. 485, 489–91 (2009). 
 80. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972); see supra 
note 7 (describing why this case is commonly called the “Keith case”).  
 81. Keith, 407 U.S. at 314; see also id. at 320 (“Official surveillance, whether its 
purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence gathering, risks infringement of 
constitutionally protected privacy of speech. Security surveillances are especially sensitive 
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of harm to support the plaintiffs’ claim of excessive government surveillance, it 
also noted its recognition of “constitutional violations” arising from the “deterrent 
or ‘chilling’ effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition 
against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”82 
Episodic solitude—in essence, the periodic absence of the perception of 
observation—is a crucial aspect of daily life. People need solitude for comfort, 
curiosity, self-development, even mental health.83 As Alan Westin argues: privacy 
allows for “respite from the emotional stimulation of daily life”;84 “[t]o be always 
‘on’ would destroy the human organism.”85 Charles Fried notes that, were our 
every action public, we might limit what we think and say.86  
Indeed, the lack of any time away from others is a common feature of the 
modern dystopian novel. George Orwell’s “telescreens” from Nineteen Eighty-Four 
continue to haunt the contemporary imagination.87 In Yevgeny Zamyatin’s We, the 
buildings are completely transparent.88 The most frequently repeated act of mental 
conditioning in Aldus Huxley’s Brave New World is the dislike of solitude.89 
Importantly, the observation at issue need not be actual, only perceived or 
suspected. Many of the harms we associate with a person seeing us—
embarrassment, chilling effects, loss of solitude—flow from the mere belief that 
one is being observed.90 This is the exact lesson of the infamous Panopticon.91 The 
                                                                                                                 
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the necessarily broad 
and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the temptation to utilize such 
surveillances to oversee political dissent.”).  
 82. 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). 
 83. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 163–64 (cataloguing the 
role of solitude in daily life); see also BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., PRIVACY: STUDIES IN SOCIAL 
AND CULTURAL HISTORY 73 (1984); Julie E. Cohen, Cyberspace as/and Space, 107 COLUM. 
L. REV. 210 (2007); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject 
As Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423–28 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives]; 
Schwartz, supra note 11, 834–43; Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1640–41 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy]; Lior 
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 
NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1736 (2008) (“Privacy theorists have long argued that protecting 
privacy is essential so that individuals can relax, experiment with different personalities to 
figure out who they truly are, or develop the insights that will make them more productive 
citizens.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 84. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 35. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Fried, supra note 1, at 483–84 (“If we thought that our every word and deed were 
public, fear of disapproval or more tangible retaliation might keep us from doing or saying 
things which we would do or say if we could be sure of keeping them to ourselves.”).  
 87. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949). 
 88. YEVGENY ZAMYATIN, WE 28 (Clarence Brown trans., Penguin Books 1993) (1924) 
(citizen D-503 refers to the “splendid, transparent, eternal glass” that composes nearly every 
structure).  
 89. ALDUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 241 (Harper Perennial 1946).  
 90. See M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and 
Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 809, 842–48 (2010).  
 91. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 200 
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977). The Panopticon was designed by 
early nineteenth century philosopher Jeremy Bentham. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE 
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tower is always visible, but the guard’s gaze is never verifiable. As Michel 
Foucault explores, prisoners behave not because they are actually being observed, 
but because they believe they might be.92 The Panopticon works precisely because 
people can be mistaken about whether someone is watching them and nonetheless 
suffer similar or identical effects.93  
A related point can be made regarding dummy cameras94 and, as it turns out, 
mere representations of people. Even where we know intellectually that we are 
interacting with an image or a machine, our brains are hardwired to respond as 
though a person were actually there.95 This reaction includes the feeling of being 
observed or evaluated.96 People pay more for coffee on the honor system, for 
instance, if eyes are depicted over the collection box.97 Our attitude, our behavior, 
even our physiology can and do change in circumstances where no real person is 
there.98  
B. Objective Privacy Harms 
Subjective privacy harms are injuries individuals experience from being 
observed. But why does the belief that one is being observed cause discomfort or 
apprehension? In some instances, the response seems to be reflexive or physical. 
The presence of another person, real or imagined, creates a state of “psychological 
                                                                                                                 
PANOPTICONIC WRITINGS (Mirin Bozovic ed., 1995). 
 92. See FOUCAULT, supra note 91, at 200–01. 
 93. Id. at 201 (“Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state 
of consciousness and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.”). 
Cf. Arthur R. Miller, Privacy: Is There Any Left?, 3 FED. CT. L. REV. 87, 100 (2009) (“[I]t 
does not matter if there really is a Big Brother on a screen watching us. It does not matter in 
the slightest. The only thing that matters is that people think there is a Big Brother watching 
them.”). It may be argued that this harm is not one of privacy but of discipline. I believe it is 
both: privacy can be harmed by observation in service of discipline, just as the body can be 
harmed by the application of disciplinary force.  
 94. Customers purchasing certain “awkward” products experienced measurably higher 
levels of discomfort when a dummy camera was trained on the register. See Thomas J.L. van 
Rompay, Dorette J. Vonk & Marieke L. Fransen, The Eye of the Camera: Effects of Security 
Cameras on Prosocial Behavior, 41 ENV’T & BEHAV. 1, 60–74 (2009).  
 95. Calo, supra note 90, at 811 (“Study after study shows that humans are hardwired to 
react to technological facsimiles . . . as though a person were actually present. . . . We of 
course understand intellectually the difference between a person and a computer-generated 
image. But a deep literature in communications and psychology evidences that we ‘rarely 
make[] distinctions between speaking to a machine and speaking to a person’ . . . . ” 
(alteration in original) (quoting CLIFFORD NASS & SCOTT BRAVE, WIRED FOR SPEECH: HOW 
VOICE ACTIVATES AND ADVANCES THE HUMAN-COMPUTER RELATIONSHIP 4 (2005))).  
 96. Id. at 838–42 (collecting studies). 
 97. Id. at 812. 
 98. Id. at 813. This means that even a robot can invade solitude. 
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arousal” that can be harmful if excessive and unwanted.99 The embarrassment of 
being seen naked seems similarly ingrained, at least throughout Western society.100 
Often, however, we are apprehensive about being observed due to the concern 
that such observation will lead to some adverse, real-world consequence. The 
consequence could be concrete: TJX customers worry about that company’s data 
breach, for instance, because it could lead to costly identity theft.101 Or the 
consequence could be more diffuse, as in the formation of a negative judgment 
about a person at issue in the tort of public disclosure of private fact.102 
Objective privacy harms are those harms that are external to the victim and 
involve the forced or unanticipated use of personal information. By “personal,” I do 
not mean “personally identifiable” in the statutory sense.103 Rather, I mean 
specifically related to a person. The use of general information to justify an action 
is not a privacy harm. Advertisers might use the “fact” that a beautiful 
spokesperson makes a product more attractive in an effort to sell everyone cars. It 
is only when specific information about a person—age, preferences, 
vulnerabilities—is used to market to that person that privacy is implicated. 
The use must also be unanticipated. It is not a privacy harm to use a person’s 
information if he himself publicized it or if he understood and agreed to the use.104 
                                                                                                                 
 
 99. Psychological arousal refers to the absence of relaxation and assurance that 
correlates with the presence of others. See Lee Sproull, Mani Subramani, Sara Kiesler, Janet 
H. Walker & Keith Waters, When the Interface Is a Face, 11 HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 
97, 112 (1996); van Rompay et al., supra note 94, at 62.  
 100. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 53, 147; Posner, Privacy, 
Surveillance, and Law, supra note 3, at 245 (“In many cultures, including our own, there is a 
nudity taboo.”).  
 101. In re TJX Cos. Retail Sec. Breach Litig., 564 F.3d 489, 491 (1st Cir. 2009) (“In 
January 2007, TJX Companies, Inc. (‘TJX’), headquartered in Massachusetts and a major 
operator of discount stores, revealed that its computer systems had been hacked. Credit or 
debit card data for millions of its customers had been stolen. Harm resulted not only to 
customers but, it appears, also to banks that had issued the cards (‘issuing banks’), which 
were forced to reimburse customers for fraudulent use of the cards and incurred other 
expenses.”).  
 102. See William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 392–98 (1960). Note that the 
event may be internal to the person forming the negative opinion, but external, and hence 
“objective” as I’m using the term, to the subject of the opinion. Moreover, subjective and 
objective harms are not always easily severable. Blackmail, for instance, involves the 
adverse use of information in the form of a threat to disclose.  
 103. Many statutory obligations only apply to “personally identifiable information,” that 
is, information such as name or social security number that can be used to identify a specific 
individual. See, e.g., California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE 
§§ 22575–22579 (West 2004) (privacy policy requirement for websites on pages where they 
collect personally identifiable information); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1785.11.2, 1798.29, 1798.82 
(West 2009) (breach notification requirement in the event of compromised personally 
identifiable information); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36a-701b (West 2009 & Supp. 2010) 
(same); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-910, 911 (2009) (same).  
 104. See supra note 60 (citing sources). Agreement exists on a spectrum. There can be 
privacy harm where, as often, the subject had little choice but to disclose. Cf. Scott R. 
Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full Disclosure 
Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that trends in the information 
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Thus, it is not necessarily a privacy harm to trade an e-mail address for a chance to 
win a sweepstakes where both parties understand that the e-mail will be used for 
marketing purposes.105 Nor is it a privacy harm for one person to decide not to 
speak to another at a party because that person is not attractive. We expect and 
tacitly consent to these sorts of discriminations.  
The problem arises when, as often, an individual has no idea that the 
information was even collected or, if she does, how it will be used. This 
fundamental tension plays out vividly in the context of online privacy. Many 
consumers have little idea how much of their information they are giving up or how 
it will be used.106 A consumer may sign up for a sweepstakes and never realize that 
doing so places him on a marketing list and increases his volume of unsolicited e-
mails.107 Or a person may share information on a social networking website and not 
realize that it could be used to deny her a job or admission to college.108  
American privacy law addresses this problem not by preventing people from 
sharing data or companies from using it, but by attempting to ensure that uses are 
anticipated and, to a lesser degree, chosen. At least one state law requires websites 
that collect personally identifiable information to disclose what they collect, how it 
is used, and with whom it is shared.109  
The Federal Trade Commission has also emphasized the “fair information 
practice principle” of notice in its enforcement activity around privacy, practically 
to the exclusion of the other principles.110 Although this system is increasingly seen 
                                                                                                                 
economy will make disclosure mandatory as a practical matter). 
 105. Of course, it may run afoul of state anti-lottery statutes if furnishing an e-mail 
constitutes “consideration.” See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 319 (2010) (“A lottery is any 
scheme for the disposal or distribution of property by chance, among persons who have paid 
or promised to pay any valuable consideration for the chance of obtaining such property or a 
portion of it . . . .”).  
 106. See Fred H. Cate, The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles, in 
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE “INFORMATION ECONOMY” 341, 360–61 (Jane K. 
Winn ed., 2006) (explaining that privacy policies are difficult to understand and that most 
Americans therefore do not read them); A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1502 (2000) (“In theory, the parties to a transaction can always contract 
for confidentiality. This is unrealistic due because consumers suffer from privacy myopia: 
they will sell their data too often and too cheaply. Modest assumptions about consumer 
privacy myopia suggest that even Americans who place a high value on information privacy 
will sell their privacy bit by bit for frequent flyer miles.” (emphasis in original)). 
 107. See Froomkin, supra note 106, at 1502.  
 108. A 2009 study showed that forty-five percent of employers surveyed used social 
networks to vet potential hires. See Jenna Wortham, More Employers Use Social Networks 
to Check Out Applicants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/more-employers-use-social-networks-to-check-
out-applicants. A more recent study commissioned by Microsoft found that seventy percent 
of human resource professionals surveyed (n = 1200) have turned down a potential job 
application based solely on online reputation information. CROSSTAB, INC., ONLINE 
REPUTATION IN A CONNECTED WORLD 3 (2010).  
 109. See California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–
22579 (West 2004). 
 110. The five fair information practice principles are notice/awareness, choice/consent, 
access/participation, integrity/security, and enforcement/redress. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
Fair Information Practice Principles, in PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998), 
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as flawed,111 it reflects the liberal intuition that free and anticipated uses of personal 
information do not constitute privacy harms and must remain unregulated.  
Alternatively, a person might suspect how information will be used and would 
not give the information up willingly precisely for that reason. She is nevertheless 
coerced into doing so. This concern appears to inform the privacy dimension of the 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We 
permit such coercion but, recognizing the harm, we require adequate process. The 
concern may even animate the age-old right not to self-incriminate, though in 
practice this right is limited to statements.112  
The coercion at issue in Schmerber v. California, where a drunk driving 
suspect’s blood was drawn and introduced as evidence against him,113 was 
relatively straightforward. But coercion exists on a spectrum.114 Many important 
activities, from air travel to medical care, are premised upon giving up information 
or revealing one’s body in potentially demeaning and uncomfortable ways. There 
may indeed be little alternative to surveillance in daily life. As Richard Posner 
observes, “If an entire city is known to be under camera surveillance . . . 
submission to it is as a practical matter involuntary . . . .”115 
The action justified by reference to personal information must of course be 
adverse; otherwise, it is likely not a “harm” in the common understanding of the 
word.116 Doctors look at our bodies not to harm us but to protect our health. 
Adversity is not always an easy question. Federal Trade Commission staff observe 
that targeted online ads benefit consumers,117 for instance, whereas a recent study 
                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm. Most of the Commission’s 
enforcement has focused on notice and security. See Cate, supra note 106. For an excellent 
survey of relevant Federal Trade Commission enforcement activity, see Marcia Hofmann, 
Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO 
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE (1st ed. 2009).  
 111. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 106, at 358 (“[T]he FTC’s approach . . . reduces notice 
and consent to a mere formality—a checkbox that consumers must select to obtain a desired 
product or service.”); Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 83, at 1397–98; Schwartz, Privacy 
and Democracy, supra note 83, at 1661–64. 
 112. Thus, a suspect or defendant could be compelled to show his person in a lineup or 
make a voice or handwriting sample. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) 
(lineup); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice sample); Gilbert v. California, 
388 U.S. 263 (1967) (handwriting sample). We might think of these and similar cases as 
involving objective privacy harm. 
 113. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
 114. At issue in Nelson v. NASA, for instance, was whether a certain category of scientist 
could be subjected to a rigorous background investigation on pain of termination. 512 F.3d 
1134 (9th Cir. 2008). The case is pending before the Supreme Court.  
 115. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and the Law, supra note 3, at 247.  
 116. For a detailed discussion of the concept of harm in the legal context, see 1–4 JOEL 
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (1987). 
 117. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE 
DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POSSIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/12/principles.shtm (“[B]ehavioral advertising provides benefits 
to consumers in the form of free web content and personalized ads that many consumers 
value . . . .”).  
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suggests that a majority of consumers find targeting problematic.118 But the 
question of whether an action is adverse is basically familiar. Courts and regulators 
confront the question of what is adverse in many statutes and standards without 
paralysis.119 
Finally, as with subjective privacy harms, human beings need not physically 
review personal information for that information to form the basis of an adverse 
action. There does not have to be a human observer who gathers and misuses 
information. Machines are perfectly competent to comb through private 
information and use it to make automatic decisions that affect us in tangible and 
negative ways.  
As Danielle Keats Citron explains in another context: 
In the past, computer systems helped humans apply rules to individual 
cases. Now, automated systems have become the primary decision 
makers. These systems often take human decision making out of the 
process of terminating individuals’ Medicaid, food stamp, and other 
welfare benefits. . . . Computer programs identify parents believed to 
owe child support and instruct state agencies to file collection 
proceedings against those individuals. Voters are purged from the rolls 
without notice, and small businesses are deemed ineligible for federal 
contracts.120  
Citron explores the harm of automated decision making from the perspective of due 
process.121 But such automated decisions can also constitute privacy harms where, 
as often, they involve the unanticipated or coerced use of sensitive personal 
information.122  
Consider an example raised by Richard Posner and others to demonstrate that no 
privacy harm occurs unless and until a human sees the information at issue.123 
Google’s e-mail service Gmail automatically scans users’ e-mails and displays 
                                                                                                                 
 
 118. Joseph Turow, Jennifer King, Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Amy Bleakley & Michael 
Hennessey, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities That Enable It, 
Working Paper Series, Social Science Research Network (Sep. 29, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1478214.  
 119. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (requiring component 
counsel to inform client of potential “adverse immigration consequences”); Ricci v. 
DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672 (2009) (defining “disparate impact” as having a 
“disproportionately adverse effect on minorities”); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 
U.S. 47, 62 (2007) (discussing “adverse effects” under the Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
 120. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1252 
(2008) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
 121. Id. at 1281–88.  
 122. I have argued that knowing the boundaries of privacy harm can help reveal the real 
value at stake. See supra Part I.A. This is not to deny that more than one value can be 
implicated at a time. 
 123. See Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, supra note 3, at 249 (discussing 
Gmail’s automated ad delivery feature); Matthew Tokson, Automation and the Fourth 
Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 627 (2011) (same).  
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advertising on the basis of keywords it picks out.124 Google assures users that no 
human ever sees the e-mail, and we have no reason to disbelieve the claim.125 
Gmail users and the people who write to them are consequently unlikely to be 
judged, embarrassed, or otherwise harmed by Google employees on the basis of e-
mail content. 
But imagine that a user of another e-mail client is trying to sell something, say, a 
bicycle, to a Gmail user. Google automatically scans the sender’s incoming e-mail, 
and, alongside the offer of sale, Google might display links to bicycles sold by its 
paid advertisers. In other words, Google in some cases may scan the content of an 
incoming e-mail and use it, without notice or consent, to compete directly with its 
author. The harm here may be negligible, but there is no basis to rule out even the 
theoretical possibility that this unwanted use of private information against its 
subject could implicate privacy. 
Or take a more dramatic example. The police ask a psychologist for her patient 
session notes. The psychologist objects, citing the Constitution, professional 
privilege, and general privacy concerns—this is really intimate information after 
all. The police respond: “Don’t worry. No one is going to look at this. We’re going 
to scan all the notes and anytime someone mentions smoking marijuana or a few 
other illegal things we’ll use the address on the file to send them a ticket. But no 
police officer will ever see anything in the notes.” We may object for other, distinct 
reasons, but again, it makes no sense to remove this scenario from consideration as 
a privacy harm.126 
Automated collection, processing, and decision making are not going 
anywhere.127 Citron’s work evidences the phenomenon and how it is even today 
serving to deny citizens tangible benefits, assess penalties, and even restrict travel 
on the basis of sometimes intimate information.128 Citron identifies a series of 
instances—airline travelers mislabeled by the data-matching programs that 
underpin the “No Fly” list; parents mislabeled as deadbeats by an automated 
system—where machines use information in surprising ways.129 We do not know 
the exact source of the information these systems rely upon, but there is every 
indication that it includes personal information not supplied by citizens for this 
purpose.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. Tokson, supra note 123, at 627. 
 125. Id.  
 126. This hypothetical can be seen as a riff on Lawrence Lessig’s example of a 
government computer virus that searches across citizens’ computers for contraband 
information. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 20–23 (2006). For Lessig, the 
virus hypothetical reveals a “latent” constitutional problem—namely, whether the program’s 
activities implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
 127. If anything, it will likely continue to grow. See Citron, supra note 120, at 1251–52 
(explaining the administrative forces that give rise to autonomous decision making); Tokson, 
supra note 123, at 602−04 (chronicling the extensive nature of automation).  
 128. Citron, supra note 120, at 1263–67. 
 129. Id. 
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C. The Advantages of Seeing Privacy Harm in This Way 
I have argued that privacy harms fall into two distinct but meaningfully related 
categories. There are several advantages to this approach. It represents a tolerable 
“fit”: most recognized privacy harms can be described in terms of the subjective 
perception of unwanted observation or the unanticipated or coerced use of a 
person’s information against them. And yet it also draws boundaries, thus guarding 
against dilution, uncovering other values, and permitting recognition of 
undocumented privacy problems. 
The approach also demonstrates the inadequacy of a widely held view about the 
nature of privacy harm: that it can only occur when one human senses another. For 
Richard Posner, privacy harm only occurs when a person accesses and misuses 
information that he should not.130 No harm occurs from the mere collection or even 
processing of information by, for instance, a computer.131 The information must 
wind up in the hands (or eyes) of a “sentient being.”132 Even then, a robust 
“professionalism”—whether by a doctor or intelligence officer—can serve to 
mitigate the privacy harm.133 And while observation alone registers on the scale,134 
real privacy harm seems to occur for Posner only where the observer takes an 
action they should not with physical or monetary consequences.  
Posner is not alone in arguing that human access to sensory or other personal 
information is a necessary component of privacy harm. Eric Goldman “question[s] 
how data mining, without more, creates consequential harm.”135 Processing alone, 
if never “displayed to a human,” leads to “no adverse consequence of any sort.”136 
Orin Kerr’s proposed test for a Fourth Amendment search is also “exposure-based” 
and denies, if not any harm, then any constitutional implication where information 
is merely processed by a computer.137 Richard Parker defines privacy specifically 
and at length as “control over who can sense us,”138 implying that a privacy harm 
only occurs when a human senses us when we do not want them to. Parker goes on 
to say that “the collection of data by government and other institutions . . . is not a 
loss of privacy per se, but rather a threat to one’s privacy.”139  
                                                                                                                 
 
 130. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, supra note 3, at 253–54. 
 131. Id. at 254. 
 132. Richard Posner, Editorial, Our Domestic Intelligence Crisis, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 
2005, at A31. 
 133. Posner, Privacy, Surveillance, and Law, supra note 3, at 251 (analogizing 
intelligence officers looking at citizens’ information to doctors looking at patients’ bodies). 
 134. Id. at 245 (“A woman (an occasional man as well) might be disturbed to learn that 
nude photographs taken surreptitiously of her had been seen by a stranger in a remote 
country before being destroyed.”).  
 135. Eric Goldman, Data Mining and Attention Consumption, in PRIVACY AND 
TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY 225–26 (Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 
2005).  
 136. Id. at 228. 
 137. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 551 
(2005). 
 138. Parker, supra note 1, at 281. 
 139. Id. at 285. 
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The requirement that a human see the person or information at issue for a 
privacy harm to occur also finds expression in the law to the extent that searches by 
nonhumans do not necessarily implicate the Fourth Amendment. In a pair of 
seminal Fourth Amendment cases, the Supreme Court held that the use of a police 
dog to determine whether drugs were present in a container was not a search 
because the dog only alerted when it came upon an illegal substance and no officer 
saw the container’s contents until he knew there was contraband.140 The argument 
has even been deployed to argue for greater privacy protection under the Fourth 
Amendment.141  
One advantage of this Essay’s approach is that it captures the full range of 
harms from observation. First, the perception of observation can still be harmful 
even if no human being ever sees the information.142 It is enough to believe that one 
is being watched to trigger adverse effects. Second, machines are clearly capable of 
collecting, processing, and acting upon private information in harmful ways 
without any human being ever seeing it.143 If anything, we have embarked upon 
ever greater automation.144 Both components of my approach capture this potential 
harm in a way that privacy harm as “unwanted sensing” cannot.  
This approach enjoys other advantages. The two components of privacy harm 
are testable. Courts and regulators are capable of investigating—particularly with 
the help of experts—whether a person felt observed, whether she consented to 
observation or collection, and whether she anticipated a given use of her 
information.145 The categories are explicit and, for the most part, uncontroversial. 
But they are sufficiently unmoored from any particular activities so as to apply to 
novel phenomena and situations.146  
The approach also furnishes criteria for ranking the relative severity of privacy 
harm. In the case of subjective privacy harms, we can look to the degree of 
aversion to any observation as distinct from the extent of observation experienced. 
High degrees of both translate into the greatest harm, but harm is possible if either 
is very high.147 
                                                                                                                 
 
 140. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 
(1983) (“A ‘canine sniff’ by a well-trained narcotics detection dog, however, does not 
require opening the luggage. It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would 
remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an officer’s rummaging through the 
contents of the luggage.”). 
 141. In Automation and the Fourth Amendment, Matthew Tokson makes the case that 
“users whose information is exposed only to automated Internet systems incur no loss of 
privacy and only a minimal risk of eventual exposure to humans.” Tokson, supra note 123, 
at 586.  He concludes on this basis that the third-party doctrine should not apply. Id. at 
586−87. 
 142. See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text.  
 143. See supra notes 120–129 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 127. 
 145. But see Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 83, at 1661–64 (describing 
the view that users consent to the terms they encounter online as the “autonomy trap”).  
 146. See supra Part I.B. 
 147. The two are, obviously, related. Extensive surveillance can breed greater aversion. 
The idea here is that each context, state, or activity may be attended by a specific level of 
aversion to observation that can in turn be invaded to a lesser or greater degree.  
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This insight is useful in describing the notoriously difficult problem of “privacy 
in public.”148 The law’s approach to privacy in public is monolithic: it generally 
refuses to see a privacy violation where the observation takes place in public on the 
theory that people in public have no reasonable expectation of privacy.149 In the 
absence of a privacy violation, meanwhile, we tend not even to look for privacy 
harm.  
Having described the properties of subjective privacy harm, however, we can 
now say that the degree of aversion is small—two out of ten, for instance. But we 
do not stop here: we must multiply the degree of aversion by the extent of 
surveillance. In the case of massive outdoor surveillance by closed-circuit 
television camera (CCTV) or pervasive aerial photography, especially where the 
footage is stored and processed, the extent of the surveillance is enormous. Thus, 
the ultimate harm can be quite large (eight out of ten).150  
Similarly, we can calculate objective privacy harms by reference to the degree 
of knowledge or consent, as distinct from the severity of the information use. 
Consider the Federal Trade Commission’s recent complaint against Sears.151 The 
Commission conceded that Sears gave notice to consumers that the software they 
were downloading would track them in some measure.152 The Commission still 
found Sears to have engaged in an unfair and deceptive trade practice, however, 
due to the extensive nature of that tracking.153 This Essay’s approach permits the 
formalization and expansion of this intuition.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. This is the notion that public information, or events that take place in public, should 
nevertheless enjoy a measure of privacy. See Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, 
Privacy in Public, and the Right to Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and 
Disseminating an Individual’s Image over the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 323–
24 (2009).  
 149. See, e.g., Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (1998) (“[T]here is no 
liability for . . . . observing [a person] or even taking his photograph while he is walking on 
the public highway.” (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 652B cmt. C)); see also Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law out of the Closet: A 
Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 990–91 (1995) 
(“Tort law clings stubbornly to the principle that privacy cannot be invaded in or from a 
public place.”); Joseph Siprut, Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for 
Expanding the Right of Privacy in Public Places, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 311, 320 (2006) 
(“[A]lthough individuals are afforded some degree of protection based on privacy rights 
while in public, the scope of this protection is narrower than one might expect.”). 
 150. Compare De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), with Laird v. Tatum, 408 
U.S. 1 (1972). In De May, the surveillance involved only one man (the doctor’s friend) but 
during a particularly intimate time (birth). De May, 9 N.W. at 146. In Laird, the surveillance 
complained of largely involved “the collection of information about public activities.” Laird, 
408 U.S. at 6. Although the information in Laird was not intimate in the same sense, the 
plaintiffs still objected enough to its systematic monitoring by the government to file a 
lawsuit. Id. at 10; see also Blackman, supra note 148, at 323. 
 151. In the Matter of Sears Holdings Management Corporation, FTC File No. 082 3099 
(Sept. 9, 2009).  
 152. Id. ¶ 8. 
 153. Id. ¶¶ 13–14.  
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III. OBJECTIONS 
This Essay has defended the project of delimiting privacy harm and argued that 
most privacy harms, properly understood, fall into two categories. A number of 
objections could be leveled. One pertains to scope: the approach deals only with 
specific instances of individual or, at most, group harm. It does not appear to deal 
with the increased risk of harm, as in the case of a security breach, and so-called 
“architectural harm.”154  
A second objection is that the approach does violence to some of our shared 
understandings. There is a basic sense in which a theory of privacy harm should 
feel right. It should to the extent possible “fit with . . . our shared intuitions of when 
privacy is or is not gained or lost.”155 I argued in Part I that we should be able to 
rule out certain harms as being privacy harms, even where authorities have used the 
rubric of privacy to address a particular problem. But even granting that privacy 
harm has boundaries, my approach may appear counterintuitive both in that it 
admits of autogenic, in the sense of causeless, privacy harm and that it appears to 
deny any harm in a paradigmatic privacy villain, the hidden Peeping Tom. This 
Part deals with each objection in turn. 
A. The Risk of Harm Objection 
California-based non-profit Privacy Rights Clearinghouse keeps track of data 
breaches. As of this writing, the organization estimates that over 355 million 
records containing personal information have been exposed to the public since 
January 2005.156 Nearly every state has a data breach notification law that requires 
individuals or firms to notify victims or the government in the event of a breach.157  
Data breaches do not automatically lead to identity theft, blackmail, or other 
malfeasance. Many of the 355 million records presumably have not been misused. 
Rather, the exposure increases the risk of negative outcomes. Isn’t this increased 
risk privacy harm in its own right, one might argue? If so, why do I not account for 
it? 
As an initial matter, data breaches register as subjective privacy harms. When a 
consumer receives a notice in the mail telling her that her personal information has 
leaked out into the open, she experiences the exact sort of apprehension and feeling 
of vulnerability the first category of privacy harm is concerned about. That is, she 
believes that there has been or could be unwanted sensing of her private 
information. The same is true, to a lesser degree, when any of us read about a data 
breach—we feel less secure in our privacy overall. 
But what if there is a data breach or other increased risk of adverse consequence 
and the “victim” never knows about it? Then there has been neither subjective nor 
objective privacy harm, unless or until the information is used. Worse still, it would 
                                                                                                                 
 
 154. See supra note 16.  
 155. See Parker, supra note 1, at 276. 
 156. See Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm#Total. 
 157. See supra note 103 (listing four examples of state statutes requiring notification).  
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appear on this analysis that breach notification is a net evil in that it creates 
(subjective) privacy harm where there would be none.  
Here I disagree with this premise. A risk of privacy harm is no more a privacy 
harm than a chance of a burn is a burn. They are conceptually distinct: one is the 
thing itself, the other the likelihood of that thing.158 A feeling of greater 
vulnerability can constitute privacy harm, just as the apprehension of battery can 
constitute a distinct tort. But there is no assault or battery without the elements of 
apprehension or unwanted contact.  
Consider another example outside of privacy: a disease that compromises the 
afflicted’s immune system but causes no other adverse physical consequence.159 
Clearly there is a harm: the sufferer lives in a state of panic and cannot travel in the 
world as before. But we gain little and lose much by conflating AIDS—an 
immunosuppressant—with the seasonal flu. Each virus has its own mechanism, 
characteristics, and treatment, even if the former makes the latter more deadly.  
Similarly, it does not disparage the seriousness of a data breach, nor the 
inconvenience of having to protect against identity theft, to deny that any objective 
privacy harm has yet occurred. If anything, clarifying the nature of the harm at risk 
should help us protect against that harm actually occurring by selecting the 
appropriate remedy. The goal of some rules is to deter specific harms, for instance; 
others exist to empower the vulnerable or hinder the powerful in an effort to make 
harm less likely.160 Data breach notification laws fulfill both functions, even if they 
are technically the “but for” cause of one category of privacy harm. 
B. The Architectural Harm Objection 
In The Digital Person and elsewhere,161 Daniel Solove argues convincingly that 
the dominant metaphor for privacy harm has too long been the aforementioned Big 
Brother of George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four.162 This is the notion of a 
monolithic power engaged in massive surveillance. The metaphor has morphed in 
recent years to a concern over many “Little Brothers,” that is, institutions and 
individuals with a problematically extensive power to observe.163 But it remains 
inadequate.  
Solove believes that the correct way to think about privacy in the contemporary 
world is not by reference to Orwell and Nineteen Eighty-Four but to Franz Kafka 
and The Trial. In The Trial, protagonist Josef K. is the subject of a mysterious legal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. Paul Ohm refers more specifically to “the accretion problem.” As he explains, 
“[o]nce an adversary has linked two anonymized databases together, he can add the newly 
linked data to his collection of outside information and use it help unlock other anonymized 
databases. Success breeds further success.” Ohm, supra note 16, at 1746. Although true, the 
“success” the accretion problem worries about is only a privacy harm when some victim 
experiences an adverse effect.  
 159. I owe this example to Daniel Solove.  
 160. Samuel Bray, Power Rules, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1172, 1173 (2010). 
 161. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 16; SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, 
supra note 4, at 133; Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 16. 
 162. ORWELL, supra note 87.  
 163. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 133. 
1158 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:1131 
 
proceeding.164 He lacks information with which to assess, let alone combat, his 
condition. Josef K. eventually succumbs to the state without ever understanding 
what has occurred.165  
For Solove, this is the risk we face as a society. We know information about us 
is being collected, processed, and used—sometimes against our interest. But we 
have no choice about, or understanding of, the underlying processes. Privacy harm 
in the contemporary world is less a function of top-down surveillance by a known 
entity for a reasonably clear if controversial purpose. It is characterized instead by 
an absence of understanding, a vague discomfort punctuated by the occasional act 
of disruption, unfairness, or violence.  
Another way to say this is that privacy harm is not merely individual, as this 
Essay has appeared to assume, but can lead to societal harms that are in a sense 
“architectural.” The absence of privacy creates and reinforces unhealthy power 
imbalances166 and interferes with citizen self-actualization.167 These harms go to the 
very architecture or structure of our society. 
There is no question that such architectural harms are important. They are not, 
however, best thought of as privacy harms. Rather, architectural harms are distinct 
harms—harms to societal cohesion and trust—that happen to be composed of 
privacy harms, and often not exclusively.  
Consider Julie Cohen’s concern, for instance, that “pervasive monitoring of 
every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward the bland 
and the mainstream.”168 This effect is a consequence of the perception of 
observation, that is, of a subjective privacy harm. Were a critical mass of society to 
experience this harm, we could imagine an “architectural” threat to civic, artistic, 
and technological innovation.169 But this does not mean that the loss of these values 
per se is a privacy harm. Lack of privacy could be a contributor—along with a 
failed intellectual property regime or inadequate public schools—for instance, to a 
serious but distinct problem.  
Or imagine the effects of an overzealous and unethical police force on the 
neighborhood it patrols. Its hypothetical officers monitor people without cause, 
issue undeserved citations, and engage in acts of police brutality. Each of these acts 
is distinct and generates a specific and different harm, worthy of individual study. 
But collectively, these harms add up to another: the erosion of community trust. 
This harm results from individual acts of excessive surveillance, but also abuse of 
discretion and unwarranted force. And it is itself none of these things.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925).  
 165. Id. at 227–29. This reading is, of course, open to interpretation.  
 166. See Solove, Privacy and Power, supra note 16. 
 167. See Schwartz, supra note 11. 
 168. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 83, at 1426. 
 169. Sadly, a recent study shows that Americans may in fact be less and less creative. See 
Po Bronson & Ashley Merryman, The Creativity Crisis, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 2010, at 44 
(“Kim found creativity scores had been steadily rising, just like IQ scores, until 1990. Since 
then, creativity scores have consistently inched downward.”). 
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C. Privacy Harms Without Privacy Violations 
There is a tendency among courts, regulators, and privacy scholars to focus on 
the collection, processing, and dissemination of information.170 Under this 
approach, a new technology—whether a snap camera in 1890171 or a genetic 
algorithm in 2009172—endangers privacy insofar as it facilitates the watching of 
individuals.173 This tendency is further reflected, as discussed above, in the 
accounts of Parker and others who view privacy harm basically in terms of 
unwanted sensing by a human being.174 Privacy harms in the main features an 
observer and an unwary or unwilling victim.  
On my account, however, there could be privacy harms without observers. I 
mean this in the weak sense that no human being needs to be doing the observing 
or decision making—the former could be merely perceived and the latter 
autonomous. But I also mean in it the strong sense that no human need ever be 
involved, even at the stage of design or implementation, for a privacy harm to 
occur. A subjective privacy harm could occur under my view because of mental 
illness or coincidence.  
Surely it would not make sense to talk of a hallucination as a privacy violation, 
the objection runs. I’m not troubled by this consequence of my theory. The concept 
of harm is not linked to the concept of violation anywhere else; why should privacy 
be any different? A person can start a fight out of malice and get his nose broken in 
self-defense by the person he attacks. The broken nose still amounts to a harm. Or a 
tree branch could fall on a person because of high winds. Again, there is clearly a 
harm. Observational harm is no different. Paranoia, hallucination, guilt associated 
with the belief that God is watching—all of these harm the values that privacy 
protects. Privacy harm does not disappear by virtue of being natural or autogenic.175  
D. Privacy Violations Without Privacy Harms 
Peeping Tom has a long, and in ways severe, history.176 Tom was the 
unfortunate boy who stole a look at Lady Godiva as she rode naked through the 
streets as a condition that her husband, the king, would cease to impose 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. Calo, supra note 90, at 817–25 (evidencing this tendency). 
 171. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 (opening with a concern over “[r]ecent 
inventions” such as “instantaneous photography”). 
 172. Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications 
of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & 
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 173. Calo, supra note 90, at 824. 
 174. See supra notes 130–39 and accompanying text. 
 175. Such harms may not be actionable as a matter of law. But does that mean we should 
not attempt to understand them? We attempt to understand earthquakes without the ability to 
sue tectonic plates.  
 176. See SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 4, at 107 (telling the original 
story). 
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backbreaking taxes on the town. Tom was blinded for his insolence.177 The image 
of Peeping Tom has evolved today into something more lurid—a man looking into 
a women’s restroom, for instance—and is commonly invoked to highlight privacy 
harm. Sometimes the reference is merely implicit, as when Justice Scalia imagines 
the officers in Kyllo v. United States spying on the unsuspecting “lady of the 
house.”178  
Were Tom alive today, he would keep his eyes. We would say that Lady Godiva 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy and could not prove damages.179 But Tom 
obviously stands in for a particular case. As Peter Swire points out, today’s 
“peeping” commonly involves improper access of a database.180 Swire develops a 
taxonomy of “peeping” into records, subdividing the act into three levels of 
severity.181 There is the “gaze,” where the perpetrator looks at another without 
permission, causing embarrassment. There is the slightly more problematic 
“gossip,” where information that has been collected is shared with others. And 
there is the “grab,” where information is retrieved and used against its subject—for 
instance, to blackmail.182 
To map my own framework onto Swire’s categories, I would say that the gaze 
involves a subjective or first category privacy harm whereas gossip and grab 
implicate second category harms. But what of the instance—surely very common—
wherein an employee looks at a record, forms no judgment, and no one ever 
knows? Relatedly, what of the Peeping Tom who observes the infamous lady in her 
sauna but neither she nor Justice Scalia ever finds out?  
On one view, the hidden or undiscovered observer represents the quintessential 
privacy harm because of the unfairness of his actions and the asymmetry between 
his and his victim’s perspective. We certainly bristle at the thought of someone 
watching us unseen in the shower. Yet my theory would not capture this activity as 
a privacy harm unless and until the observed found out about it. Without that, there 
is no perception of unwanted observation, nor is there use of information adverse to 
the individual being observed. As Richard Parker puts it: “If privacy is defined as a 
psychological state,” as I have defined it here, “it becomes impossible to describe a 
person who has had his privacy temporarily invaded without his knowledge.”183  
I do not see this disconnect as necessarily fatal to my account. Note that there 
are multiple parties involved in any Peeping Tom hypothetical, each with their own 
perspective. The participants are the perpetrator, the victim, and the audience for 
the hypothetical’s narrative. Only two of these three parties to the violation know 
about it.  
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I believe our tendency to see a privacy harm in the example of the hidden 
Peeping Tom in fact rests on a conflation between the internal and external 
perspectives.184 The victim within the hypothetical is not aware of the observation 
and hence suffers no harm. We who are external to the hypothetical do, however, 
and experience a natural empathy with the observed as we project our superior 
knowledge upon them. 
Consider the following thought experiment: an inventor creates a telescope so 
powerful that she can watch life forms on a distant planet. Or she creates a means 
by which to look at another dimension.185 In either case, she can watch any aspect 
of private life but she can never have any impact on the observed (quantum 
mechanics notwithstanding). My intuition on these “facts” is not to be concerned, 
even though the activity is functionally equivalent to the standard undetected 
peeping. Nothing more is seen by the inventor than by the peeper, and we have 
stipulated that no real world adverse action is taken against the observed in either 
case. 
There is clearly a threat that the observation will be discovered or its fruits will 
be abused.186 There is also a sense in which we as third parties might be harmed by 
the mere knowledge that such a thing as an interdimensional telescope is possible. 
We might be a little less certain of being alone in such a world. The same is true of 
the Peeping Tom: we fast forward mentally to the moment at which the deed is 
discovered and the subject is retroactively embarrassed, frightened, and shamed. 
Outside of a hypothetical, of course, the only time Peeping Toms come to light is 
after they are caught.187 
CONCLUSION 
Just as a burn is a specific and diagnosable condition, so is privacy harm a 
distinct injury with particular boundaries and properties. This Essay has argued that 
by delimiting privacy harm, we gain the ability both to rule out privacy harm where 
appropriate and to identify novel privacy harms as they emerge. By looking at 
privacy harm in the way this Essay suggests, we gain practical insight into the 
nature and range of this unique injury. Of course, the subjective and objective 
components of privacy harm are each amenable to further analysis. Privacy is in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 
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many ways on the cusp of a greater science.188 The hope is that by describing the 
outer boundaries and core properties of privacy harm in detail, this Essay has 
served to open an additional avenue of investigation. 
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